A security operations center (SOC) is the team, process, and tools that watch an organization's systems around the clock, spot attacks, and respond to them. The question here is who should run it: the organization itself (in-house), an outside managed security service provider (MSSP), or a mix of both (hybrid). There is no single right answer. The UK NCSC says there is no one-size-fits-all SOC, so the model should follow your threats, assets, and resources. This article sets out what each SOC model gives and costs, what to settle in a contract, and how to decide.
Three models: what each gives and costs
- In-house: the organization hires the analysts and runs the tools itself
- MSSP: the provider's SOC watches your systems and raises alerts, while your organization keeps the accountability
- Hybrid: the work is split between your staff and a provider. Two examples of our own: your staff cover office hours and the provider covers nights, or the provider monitors and sorts alerts while your staff decide what to do about them
Three terms are easy to confuse. The Canadian Cyber Centre separates an MSP (managed service provider), which focuses on IT operations such as the help desk and endpoint and backup management and may not monitor for security threats, from an MSSP, which runs SOCs for monitoring, detection, alerting, and incident management. It lists MDR (managed detection and response) as one MSSP service, and our article MDR: How to Choose a Provider covers buying it. So check an existing IT outsourcing contract before assuming it includes monitoring. Hybrid is not a formal standard: the Cyber Centre guide does not define it as a model, but it does describe using an MSSP to fill gaps on top of in-house security. Older UK government guidance (2015, since withdrawn) named in-house, procured, and hybrid as three delivery options.
Sources describe the trade-offs below. The staffing arithmetic in the first bullet is our own estimate, not a standard:
- Round-the-clock coverage: one seat staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week covers 168 hours a week. If one person gives about 36 to 40 productive hours a week after leave, holidays, and training, one such seat needs about 4 to 5 people (168 divided by 40 is 4.2, and 168 divided by 36 is 4.7). The Cyber Centre notes that an MSSP's SOC can cover hours when your own staff are unavailable
- Skills and tools: the Cyber Centre lists MSSP benefits as added skills and coverage, access to certified experts and threat intelligence, and lower hiring and tooling costs. NIST adds that a provider may detect an attack sooner because it can correlate events across its customers, which is a possibility rather than a promise
- Knowledge of your business: the Cyber Centre says an MSSP may be less aware of your new services and changes than an in-house team. An in-house team keeps that knowledge close but must pay for specialist hires, tool updates, and detection tools
- Accountability: responsibility is shared, but the Cyber Centre states that your organization remains accountable for protecting its data and systems. NIST describes this as a shared responsibility model in which the organization hands some of its duties to a provider
- A new risk from the provider's access: NIST notes that providers often have privileged access to systems and may reach sensitive data, so the risk of a malicious insider or a compromised provider should be addressed. The Cyber Centre adds that MSSPs are attractive targets because one breach can expose many clients
What to settle in the contract
Whoever runs the SOC, write down who does what. NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3 (April 2025) says that when an organization transfers incident response duties to a provider, the duties should be defined clearly in a contract, and the response team should know the split, including information flows, coordination, and authority to act. NIST also names limits to settle, such as whether the provider may share anonymized incident information with its other customers, and whether it may make operational decisions like deactivating a service immediately. A joint advisory from CISA and partner agencies (AA22-131A, May 2022) and the Canadian Cyber Centre (ITSM.00.500, April 2025) add items to ask for:
- Who owns each role: the contract says who owns hardening (making systems more secure by tightening settings), detection, and incident response (CISA)
- Scope and data: what data the provider captures, how it is used, where it is stored, and who it is shared with, including data residency (Cyber Centre)
- The provider's access: multi-factor authentication (MFA) on every provider account that reaches your environment, access limited to what is needed, and a review of those accounts, with accounts disabled when unused and when the contract ends (CISA)
- Notification and reporting: how and when the provider tells you about incidents, including events on its own infrastructure, plus regular performance and event reports (CISA, Cyber Centre)
- Logs: CISA advises customers to keep their most important logs for at least six months
- Assurance and exit: audit and site-visit rights, certifications such as SOC 2 Type 2 or ISO 27001 (the Cyber Centre's examples), the provider's own suppliers (CISA), and how long and how costly it is to move your data out at the end (Cyber Centre)
Making a hybrid model work
A hybrid model fails when nobody knows who acts at 3 a.m. NIST notes that an organization's leadership may hold the decision on high-impact actions such as shutting down or rebuilding critical services. So the design must say which actions the provider may take alone and which need approval from a named person at your organization. The handover below is our own example, not a standard.
Common ways to split the work (our own examples, not a standard):
- Split by hours: your staff cover office hours and the provider covers nights, weekends, and holidays
- Split by task: the provider monitors and sorts alerts, while your staff decide on high-impact actions and tune detection for your own systems
- Split by system: the provider watches common sources such as endpoints and email, while your team keeps sensitive or specialized systems
Five steps to set up a split (our own view):
- List what must be watched: which systems and which hours
- Decide who may act alone: which actions the provider takes without asking, and which need approval
- Write the split down: put it in the contract, ideally with a responsibility matrix (a table of who does what), which the NCSC also recommends
- Agree the handover: the channel, the severity levels, and the named contacts on both sides
- Test and review: run an exercise to test the handover, then review it regularly
How to choose
Start from your own situation, not from the sales pitch. The Cyber Centre says the client should first decide its SOC strategy and scope, including which sensitive assets need monitoring. The NCSC says to weigh the threats you face, the assets you protect, and the resources you have, and to build a target operating model (a plan for how the SOC will work) from them. Five questions of our own can guide the choice. The same factors appear in our SOC Architecture Blueprint for Government Agencies:
- Data: may logs leave the organization or the country? If not, favor in-house, or a provider whose SOC runs inside your own environment, which the Cyber Centre describes as one possible setup
- Hours: do you need 24x7 coverage? If you cannot staff nights, consider a provider or a hybrid split by hours
- Skills: can you hire and keep analysts and engineers? If not, a provider can fill the gap
- Budget: compare the full cost of staff, tools, and training with the provider's fees, not only the fee itself
- Control: how much decision authority must stay with you, for example on shutting a system down?
In our view, many organizations can start with a hybrid model and move work in-house as skills grow. Whatever you choose, measure outcomes such as time to detect and time to respond (see Using AI in the SOC to Reduce MTTD and MTTR) and ask a provider to report in the same terms. The choice of tools (a SIEM, which collects and correlates logs, with SOAR, which automates response, or an XDR) is a separate question, covered in SIEM, SOAR and XDR Compared: Strengths and Limits.
Common mistakes
- Believing outsourcing moves the risk to the provider: the Cyber Centre says the organization remains accountable for its data and systems
- Assuming the IT outsourcing contract includes security monitoring: an MSP may not monitor for threats, so read what the contract covers
- Not telling the provider about new systems: an MSSP may be less aware of your changes than an in-house team
- Leaving provider accounts active after the contract ends: CISA notes this is often overlooked
- Starting a hybrid model with no written handover: nobody knows who acts at night (our own view)
- Counting one person per 24x7 seat: a seat covers 168 hours a week, and one person gives about 36 to 40 productive hours (our own estimate)
- Choosing by the fee alone: staff, tools, training, and the effort of managing the provider all cost money (our own view)
Start today
- Write down what must be monitored: systems, data, and the hours that matter
- Check current contracts: does any IT outsourcing contract include security monitoring?
- Do the staffing arithmetic: how many people would a 24x7 seat need at your real working hours?
- Draft a responsibility list: who hardens, who detects, who responds, and who approves high-impact actions
- Prepare questions for providers: a sample service level agreement (SLA, the promised response and resolution times), where data is stored, and how provider accounts are controlled
To see where your security operations stand today, try the self-assessment. To plan the SOC itself, see SOC Architecture Blueprint for Government Agencies.
Scope and accuracy
This article draws on NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3 (April 2025), read from the NIST PDF; the Canadian Cyber Centre guides ITSM.10.023 (October 2022) and ITSM.00.500 (April 2025); the NCSC pages on building a SOC (May 2022, overview pages only, not the linked sub-pages) and on choosing an MSP (November 2025); CISA advisory AA22-131A (May 2022); and a 2015 UK government page that has been withdrawn. We read these pages on 4 November 2026. We could not open MITRE's book on SOC strategy because the website blocked our access, so no claim here is taken from it. The staffing arithmetic, the hybrid examples, the five-step setup, and the five decision questions are our own view, not from the sources. This is general guidance, not legal advice. Standards and guidance change, so check the current versions.
References and further reading
- NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3: Incident Response Recommendations and Considerations: incident response guidance, including how to share duties with an outside provider
- UK NCSC: Building a Security Operations Centre: no one-size-fits-all SOC, designing from threats, assets, and resources
- UK NCSC: Choosing a managed service provider (MSP): responsibility matrix, contract topics, and a due diligence checklist (written for small and medium organisations)
- Canadian Cyber Centre: Choosing the best cyber security solution (ITSM.10.023): MSSP benefits and drawbacks, MSP versus MSSP, and evaluation criteria
- Canadian Cyber Centre: Recommended contract clauses for SOC procurement (ITSM.00.500): topics for contracts when buying SOC services
- CISA AA22-131A: Protecting Against Cyber Threats to Managed Service Providers and their Customers: advice for customers on contracts, access, logs, and incident notification
- UK CESG: Security operations and management, introduction (withdrawn 2016): withdrawn older guidance naming in-house, procured, and hybrid options
- MITRE: 11 Strategies of a World-Class Cybersecurity Operations Center: MITRE's book on SOC strategy (we could not open its text, see Scope and accuracy)