A tabletop exercise is a talk-through in which the people who hold roles in a plan sit together and discuss what they would do in a made-up incident, without touching real systems. Here the made-up incident is ransomware (malware that encrypts data and demands payment), and the article includes a ready-to-use ransomware tabletop exercise template that we wrote ourselves as an example. It follows Network and Cyber Security Simulators: Types and Uses, which compares several kinds of simulation tools.
What a tabletop is and what it can test
NIST SP 800-84 describes a tabletop as a discussion-only exercise. A facilitator presents a scenario and asks participants questions, which starts a discussion of roles, responsibilities, coordination, and decision-making. No equipment or real resources are deployed. The document says it typically runs two to eight hours and is a cost-effective tool for checking that plans, such as incident response plans, are workable in an emergency. SP 800-84 was published in September 2006 and NIST's page still lists it as final, so some details are dated, such as the example of backing up files to a CD-ROM.
CISA offers the CISA Tabletop Exercise Packages (CTEP); the page says there are over 100. Each package has customizable objectives, scenarios, and discussion questions, plus a list of references. The cyber packages cover several threats, including ransomware, and come with supporting documents such as an invitation template, a slide deck, a participant feedback form, and an After Action Report. You can use CTEP alongside this article, because our template is only an example outline.
Preparing the exercise: six steps from NIST
SP 800-84 breaks exercise design into the steps below. It says planning should start at least one month ahead, and three months for large, complex exercises:
- Determine the topic: base it on the plan being exercised, such as the incident response plan
- Determine the scope: by audience; NIST advises exercising senior-level and operational-level teams separately at first, then together to check coordination
- Identify the objectives: validate the plan's content, its documented roles and responsibilities, and the interdependencies
- Identify the participants: the people with roles in the plan, with a written invitation sent as soon as possible
- Identify the exercise staff: a facilitator and a data collector who records what happens
- Coordinate logistics: such as the room, equipment, and handouts
NIST recommends three documents: a facilitator guide (with the scenario, the questions, and a copy of the plan being exercised), a participant guide (the same content without the full question list), and an after action report. It also warns that scenarios do not need to be very detailed; a short, concise scenario is often more effective, because with long detailed ones participants tend to spend more time dissecting the story than meeting the objectives.
Ransomware scenario template: our own example
Important note: this section and the next two are an example that DynaSec wrote ourselves. It does not come from CISA, NIST, or any other source. The organization, the times, and all events are fictional. Adapt it to your own systems, teams, and plan before use.
Assume the fictional organization has a central file server, an accounting system, and a backup server in the same domain, and that everything happens over about a day and a half, from Wednesday morning to Thursday morning. The template has four objectives: check who declares an incident, check who may disconnect the network, check that people can communicate if email is down, and check whether the recovery order was agreed in advance. The facilitator releases one inject (a new piece of information fed in during the exercise) at a time, asks the questions, and asks participants to make the decision.
Injects 1 to 3: detection and decisions
Inject 1 (Wednesday 08:30): the help desk gets three calls saying files on the shared drive will not open and have odd extensions. One user finds a text file on the desktop demanding payment.
- Question: who takes this over from the help desk, and whom does the plan say to notify first?
- Question: what makes this a security incident rather than just a system problem, and does the plan write down the criteria?
- Question: what is the first thing to check?
- Decision point: do we declare an incident now, and who declares it?
Inject 2 (09:15): monitoring shows the same behavior spreading to another file server, and an administrator account is being used from a workstation it does not normally use. Company email is slowing down and is unreachable from some machines.
- Question: who has the authority to order a network disconnect or a system shutdown, and whom must they ask for approval?
- Question: what work does the disconnect affect, and how are system owners told?
- Question: if email and chat are unusable, how does the team reach each other? (The #StopRansomware Guide recommends an out-of-band channel such as phone calls)
- Decision point: which part of the network is cut off, and who approves?
Inject 3 (11:00): the backup administrator reports that last night's backup job finished normally, but the backup server is in the same domain as the attacked machines and nobody can yet confirm the backups are intact.
- Question: how do we check that the backups are usable and not contaminated?
- Question: which systems are restored first, who decides, and was it agreed in advance? (See Ransomware Recovery Plan: RTO, RPO and Rehearsals)
- Question: if we still do not know how the attacker got in, what does restoring now risk?
- Decision point: pick the top three systems to restore, and decide whether to start before the entry point is known
Injects 4 and 5: communication and recovery
Inject 4 (14:00): executives receive an email from the attackers claiming they stole data and threatening to publish it unless payment is made by a deadline. At the same time a reporter phones the corporate communications team.
- Question: who answers executives, the reporter, and staff, and who reviews every message first?
- Question: whom must we notify, such as legal counsel, external providers, the insurer, and relevant authorities? (Check legal and contractual requirements with your own legal owner)
- Question: how do we confirm whether data was actually stolen?
- Decision point: who has the authority to decide on any contact with the attackers, and on what information? (This template does not suggest whether to pay)
Inject 5 (Thursday 09:00): key systems are partly restored. The team has worked through the night and is handing over shifts. Monitoring alerts that a just-restored machine shows the same suspicious behavior as before.
- Question: how is work handed over across shifts so information is not lost?
- Question: how will we know the incident is over, and who declares it? (The #StopRansomware Guide says to formally declare the incident over)
- Question: which lessons should be recorded now, without waiting for the end? (NIST Rev. 3 advises sharing lessons as soon as they are found)
- Decision point: pause restoration or continue, and who decides?
Closing the exercise and recording results
SP 800-84 has the facilitator and data collector run a hotwash (an immediate debrief after the exercise), asking participants what they did well, where they need more training, and which parts of the plan should be updated. A report then follows, the After Action Report, containing background on the exercise, the recorded observations, and recommendations for improving the plan. The evaluation criteria should be set before the exercise so the data collector knows what to record.
Common mistakes
- Using a scenario that is too long and detailed: NIST says participants then spend more time on the story than on the objectives
- Inviting only IT: NIST says to invite everyone with roles in the plan, and to include senior staff when the goal is to check decision-making
- Exercising without a copy of the real plan on the table: NIST's facilitator guide includes a copy of the plan being exercised
- Having no data collector and no report: the flaws found are lost after the day ends
- Ending with fixes that nobody owns: NIST has the plan coordinator assign action items to selected people
- Using a ready-made template unchanged: its events may not match the organization's real systems or authority
Wasted
- Long, detailed scenariotalk is about the story, not the objectives
- Only IT inviteddecisions and coordination go untested
- No notes, no reportflaws are lost after the day ends
Useful
- Short, concise scenariofocused on the stated objectives
- Everyone with a roleincluding senior staff to test decisions
- Data collector and reportfixes are assigned to owners
Start today
- Choose the plan to exercise, such as the incident response plan in Incident Response Plan Under NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3
- Download a package from CISA's CTEP page and compare it with our template
- Adapt the five injects to your real systems and team names
- Name a facilitator and a data collector, and invite participants in advance
- Start with a short one-to-two-hour session, then write the fix list with an owner and a due date for each item
To see how ready your organization is overall before the exercise, try our self-assessment.
References and further reading
- CISA Tabletop Exercise Packages: CISA's exercise templates, over 100 packages
- NIST SP 800-84: guide to testing, training, and exercising IT plans (published 2006)
- NIST SP 800-84 (PDF): see section 4 on tabletops and Appendix A with sample documents
- #StopRansomware Guide: ransomware response checklist from CISA, NSA, FBI, and MS-ISAC
- NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3: the incident response guidance behind the plan you will exercise